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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Andrew Galo appeals the sentence that was imposed 
following his conditional plea of guilty to pr oduction of 
material depicting the sexual exploitation of childr en, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2251(a), and possession of material 
depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor , in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4)(B). He argues that these statutes are 
unconstitutional per se, and as applied to him. He also 
challenges the district court's use of his prior state court 
convictions to enhance his sentence and impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment. 
We hold that Congress validly exer cised its authority under 
the Commerce Clause in enacting SS 2251(a) and 
2252(a)(4)(B), and that those statutes are not 
unconstitutional as applied to Galo. We do, however, agree 
that the sentencing court erred in enhancing his sentence 
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based upon his prior state court convictions, and we will 
therefore remand for resentencing. 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND. 
 
In 1996, Galo was in a relationship with Sheila H. She 
had a young daughter whom we will refer to as Jessica H. 
Jessica H. had previously been sexually abused by one of 
her mother's boyfriends. That abuse caused Childr en and 
Youth Services ("CYS") to temporarily r emove Jessica from 
her home. She had been placed back in her home befor e or 
during Galo's relationship with her mother . 
 
At some point, Galo persuaded Sheila H. to per mit 
Jessica H., then thirteen years old, to spend a night at his 
apartment. Galo accomplished this by threatening to tell 
CYS that Sheila H. had previously permitted Jessica H. to 
have contact with him. This would have jeopar dized 
Sheila's custody of her daughter because Galo had a state 
criminal record, the nature of which we discuss below. 
Sheila knew that Jessica should not have been per mitted to 
be in Galo's company without supervision because of Galo's 
background. Galo also threatened to have the utilities at 
Sheila H.'s residence turned off unless Jessica spent time 
with him. The utilities were register ed in his name. In 
addition to threats and coercion, Galo also cajoled Sheila by 
telling her that he might one day be Jessica's step-father, 
and suggesting that he and Jessica therefor e needed time 
to get acquainted. 
 
On the evening of March 1, 1999 Jessica did stay with 
Galo. During her visit he took approximately 21 sexually 
explicit nude photographs of her after instructing her to 
pose nude and expose her genitals. Jessica knew that Galo 
had a temper and she was therefore appar ently too afraid 
to resist or refuse. 
 
Galo took the undeveloped film containing these 
photographs to an Eckerd Drug Store for pr ocessing. 
However, the photo manager there stopped processing the 
film and alerted police as soon as she discover ed the 
sexually explicit nature of the photographs. Police 
responded and arrested Galo when he r eturned to pick-up 
the developed photographs. Initially Galo told the police 
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that the film belonged to a friend in Ohio, but he later 
changed his story and admitted that he knew the child in 
the photographs was naked. He denied having inter course 
with her and claimed that he only wanted to see if the 
pictures would "come out." Police obtained a search 
warrant of Galo's residence and seized 10 additional 
pictures of Jessica, as well as pictures of Galo's nieces. 
Some of the pictures were of girls in their underwear while 
others were fully clothed. Police also seized a.35mm Vivitar 
camera that was later identified as being the camera that 
took the indecent photographs. Subsequent investigation 
disclosed that the indecent pictures of Jessica had been 
processed on Kodak paper. The photographic paper, film, 
and Vivitar camera had all been manufactur ed outside of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
 
On April 6, 1999, a federal grand jury charged Galo in a 
two count indictment. Count One charged him with 
production of material depicting the sexual exploitation of 
children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2251(a), and Count Two 
charged him with possession of material depicting the 
sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2252(a)(4)(B). Galo filed a motion to dismiss the 
indictment alleging that SS 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B) were 
unconstitutional. He also claimed that application of the 
statutes to him deprived him of equal protection of the 
laws. 
 
On July 29, 1999, the district court denied Galo's motion 
to dismiss the indictment and Galo immediately enter ed a 
conditional plea of guilty to both counts of the indictment. 
He preserved the following issues for appeal: 
 
       (a) Whether Title 18, United States Code, Section 
       2251(a) is a valid exercise of the authority granted to 
       Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
 
       (b) Whether the evidence supporting the jurisdictional 
       element of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
       2251(a) is sufficient under the Commerce Clause. 
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       (c) Whether Title 18, United States Code, Section 
       2252(a)(4)(B) is a valid exercise of the authority granted 
       to Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
 
       (d) Whether the evidence supporting the jurisdictional 
       element of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
       2252(a)(4)(B) is sufficient under the Commer ce Clause. 
 
The court accepted Galo's plea and thereafter r equested 
that Galo and the government file briefs addressing 
whether Galo's prior state convictions would subject him to 
the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years, contained in 
18 U.S.C. S 2251(d). Galo argued that he was not subject to 
the mandatory minimum sentence because the state 
convictions did not relate to the sexual exploitation of 
children as required under S 2251(d). The district court 
disagreed and concluded that Galo's prior state court 
convictions did subject him to the mandatory minimum. 
Consequently, the district court sentenced Galo to a term of 
imprisonment of 15 years (180 months), followed byfive 
years of supervised release. 
 
This appeal followed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION. 
 
A. Constitutional Challenge to 
18 U.S.C. SS 2251(a) AND 2252(b)(4)(B). 
 
As noted above, Galo pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 
SS 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B). Section 2251(a), is captioned 
"Sexual Exploitation of Children," and pr ovides in relevant 
part as follows: 
 
       Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, 
       entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, . .. any 
       sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of pr oducing 
       any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be 
       punished as provided under subsection (d), if such 
       person knows or has reason to know that such visual 
       depiction will be transported in interstate or for eign 
       commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was 
       produced using materials that have been mailed, 
       shipped, or transported in interstate or for eign 
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       commerce by any means, including by computer, or if 
       such visual depiction has actually been transported in 
       interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2251(a) (emphasis added). Section 2252(a)(4)(B), 
is captioned "Certain activities relating to material involving 
the sexual exploitation of minors," and pr ovides in relevant 
part: 
 
       (a) Any person who . . . (4) either . . . (B) knowingly 
       possesses 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, 
       films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any 
       visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been 
       shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
       commerce, or which was produced using materials 
       which have been mailed or so shipped or transported 
       by any means including computer, if -- (i) the 
       producing of such visual depiction involves the use of 
       a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (ii) 
       such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be 
       punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2252(b)(4)(B). After Galo was sentenced, we 
decided United States v. Rodia, 194 F .3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 2008 (2000). There we 
held that Congress enacted S 2252(a)(4)(B) pursuant to a 
valid exercise of authority under the Commer ce Clause. 
Section 2252(a)(4)(B) imposes criminal liability on anyone 
who possesses child pornography that has not itself 
traveled in interstate commerce, so long as one of the 
materials used to create the pornography has traveled in 
interstate commerce. We reasoned that Congress could 
have rationally concluded that intrastate possession of 
child pornography created a demand that substantially 
affected interstate commerce. Accor dingly, Congress could 
regulate intrastate possession of child por nography under 
the Commerce Clause in order to ef fectively regulate its 
impact on interstate commerce. Although Rodia focused 
only on S 2252(a)(4)(B), the same reasoning governs our 
analysis of S 2251(a) because both statutes contain the 
same jurisdictional element. 
 
As we explained in Rodia, "[a] jurisdictional element [or 
hook] . . . refers to a provision in a federal statute that 
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requires the government to establish specific facts justifying 
the existence of federal jurisdiction in connection with any 
individual application of the statute." Rodia  at 471. Here, 
the requirement that at least one of the materials used to 
produce the child pornography travel in interstate 
commerce provides the jurisdictional hook. Consequently, 
we find that Rodia forecloses Galo's attack upon the 
constitutionality of SS 2252 (a) and 2252 (a)(4)(B). 
Nonetheless, even though we are clearly bound by our 
holding in Rodia,1 Galo argues that Rodia was wrongly 
decided. He asserts that Rodia ignor es the jurisdictional 
requirement contained in S 2254(b)(4)(B). Galo misreads 
Rodia. 
 
In Rodia we concluded that the jurisdictional hook of 
S 2252(a)(4)(B) does not achieve the goal of limiting the 
reach of the statute to "activity that has a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce." 194 F.3d at 468. We recognized 
that the "jurisdictional element -- the r equirement that 
precursor materials like film or cameras moved in interstate 
commerce -- is only tenuously related to the ultimate 
activity regulated: interstate possession of child 
pornography." Id. at 473. W e noted that, "[a]s a practical 
matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is almost useless 
here, since all but the most self-sufficient child 
pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or chemicals that 
traveled in interstate commerce and will ther efore fall 
within the sweep of the statute." Id. Nevertheless, we held 
that Congress was empowered to enact the statute under 
the Commerce Clause because "Congress rationally could 
have believed that intrastate possession of por nography has 
substantial effects on interstate commer ce." Id. at 468.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Internal 
Operating Procedure 9.1. 
 
2. There are three broad categories of activity that Congress can regulate 
under the Commerce Clause: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) 
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) those activities 
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). In Rodia , we found that categories (1) 
and (2) were not pertinent to our analysis and turned our attention to 
category (3), which was at the "heart of the matter." 194 F.3d at 473- 
474. 
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Galo argues that Rodia was incorr ectly decided because we 
ignored the reality that Congress had criminalized purely 
intrastate, local activity. However, despite Galo's argument 
to the contrary, we were well aware that the statute 
"criminaliz[ed] an activity that is not dir ectly linked to 
interstate commerce." Id. at 468. However, as we noted 
there, the fact that purely local activity is criminalized is 
not fatal to the statute. 
 
       The precise question before us is whether it was within 
       Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to enact 
       18 U.S.C. S 2254(a)(4)(B), which imposes criminal 
       liability on individuals who possess child por nography 
       that has not itself traveled in interstate commer ce as 
       long as one of the materials from which the 
       pornography was created . . . has so traveled. 
 
Id. at 468. Rodia answers the inquiry in the affirmative and 
Galo's attack on the constitutionality of the statute is 
therefore to no avail. 
 
His assertion that the statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to him is also without merit as our analysis in 
Rodia clearly shows that Congress could pr operly regulate 
intrastate possession of child pornography pr oduced by 
materials that had traveled in interstate commer ce.3 
Consequently, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
 
B. Sentence Enhancement Pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. S 2251(d). 
 
Galo's challenge to the district court's sentencing 
enhancement is more troubling. 18 U.S.C.S 2251(d) 
provides in relevant part: 
 
       Any individual who violates . . . this section shall be 
       fined under this title or imprisoned not less than ten 
       (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years, but if such 
       person has one prior conviction under this chapter[18 
       U.S.C. S 2251 et seq.], . . . or under the laws of any 
       State relating to the sexual exploitation of children, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As noted above, the camera and film that Galo used both traveled in 
interstate commerce. 
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       such person shall be fined under this title and 
       imprisoned for not less than fifteen (15) years nor more 
       than thirty (30) years . . . . 
 
Galo's enhancement is based upon two guilty pleas he 
entered in state court in 1990. In January of that year 
Galo's niece told New Kensington, Pennsylvania police that 
Galo had been sexually abusing her from her pr eschool 
years up to fifth grade. According to the niece, the abuse 
initially consisted of vaginal touching, but it pr ogressed to 
oral sex and intercourse. The abuse stopped when the niece 
told her mother. However, she also told police that Galo had 
sexually abused her brothers. The police subsequently 
questioned her brothers, and they confir med that Galo had 
also sexually abused them. 
 
Galo's older nephew, then age 18, told police that Galo 
had been sexually abusing him for the past six years. The 
abuse consisted of oral and anal sex, and touching of each 
other's genitals. Galo's younger nephew, then age 16, told 
the police that Galo had sexually abused him at various 
times from the time he was 6 to the time he r eached 13. 
That abuse also consisted of oral sex and touching of 
genitalia. 
 
On February 16, 1990, Galo was charged in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, with 
two counts of involuntary deviate sexual inter course, two 
counts of corruption of minors, two counts of endangering 
the welfare of children and four counts of indecent assault. 
 
On March 16, 1991, Galo appeared befor e a state trial 
judge and pled guilty to corruption of minors, endangering 
the welfare of children and indecent assault. Charges of 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse wer e dropped 
pursuant to a plea agreement. The court accepted the plea 
and sentenced Galo to one and one-half to thr ee years 
imprisonment. When Galo was finally released from custody 
on that sentence he began his parole. As a condition of that 
parole he was required to complete a sexual offender 
program and he was prohibited from r esiding in a home 
where minors were present. He was on parole when he 
became involved with Sheila. 
 
                                9 
  
The district court relied upon the transcript of Galo's 
guilty plea hearing in state court, the elements of the state 
offenses he pled guilty to, and the relevant proof offered by 
the state in its prosecution of Galo, and deter mined that 
Galo's prior state conviction "related to the sexual 
exploitation of children" for purposes of an enhancement 
under S 2251(d). However, in reaching that conclusion, the 
court necessarily focused on Galo's conduct, as opposed to 
the elements of the offenses he was convicted of in state 
court.4 
 
Galo now argues that the district court incorr ectly 
concluded that he had been convicted of violating state 
laws "relating to the sexual exploitation of children," as 
required to enhance his sentence. He insists that the 
district court was required to follow a"categorical 
approach" in deciding whether the enhancement provisions 
of S 2251(d) applied. Under the "categorical approach," the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As calculated by the U. S. Probation Office, Galo's total offense level 
was 28 and his criminal history category was II, yielding a guideline 
range for imprisonment of 87 months (7.25 years) to 108 months (9 
years). Presentence Report ("PSR") atPP 29, 32, 64. However, the 
statutorily required minimum sentence for violating S 2251(a) is 120 
months (10 years) for individuals who have never been convicted of any 
of the federal crimes specified in S 2251(d) or convicted of an offense 
relating to the sexual exploitation of childr en under the law of any 
state. 
18 U.S.C. S 2251(d). The statutorily r equired minimum sentence for 
violating S 2251(a) is 180 months (15 years) for individuals who have one 
prior conviction for any of the federal crimes specified in S 2251(d) or 
one 
prior conviction for an offense relating to the sexual exploitation of 
children under the law of any state. Id.  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5G1.1(b), 
"[w]here a statutorily requir ed minimum sentence is greater than the 
maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required 
minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence." 
 
Section 2251(d) further provides that if a defendant has 2 or more 
convictions "under this chapter [18 U.S.C.S 2251 et seq.] or chapter 
109A, or chapter 117, or under the laws of any State relating to the 
sexual exploitation of children, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not 
less than 30 years nor more than life." However, in the district court the 
parties agreed that although Galo pled guilty to multiple offenses, those 
prior offenses would amount to only one prior conviction for purposes of 
sentence enhancement under S 2251(d), because his pleas were entered 
simultaneously. App. at 149-151. 
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sentencing court can look only to the fact of conviction and 
the statutory definition of the prior offense. The court's 
analysis is not controlled by the conduct giving rise to the 
conviction. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-602 
(1990). 
 
In Taylor, the defendant conditionally pled guilty to being 
a convicted felon-in-possession of a firear m in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). That plea subjected him to the 
sentencing enhancement contained in 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) 
which provides as follows: 
 
       (1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) 
       of this title and has three previous convictions by any 
       court . . . for a violent felony . . . such person shall be 
       fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less 
       than fifteen years. . . . 
 
       (2) As used in this subsection-- 
 
        . . . . . 
 
       "(B) the term `violent felony' means any crime 
       punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
       year . . . that-- 
 
       "(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
       threatened use of physical force against the person of 
       another; or 
 
       "(ii) is burglary [or other specified offenses] or otherwise 
       involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
       of physical injury to another. 
 
Id. at 578. Taylor conceded that his prior convictions for 
assault and robbery counted toward the enhancement 
because they involved the use of physical for ce against 
persons. However, he argued that the district court could 
not rely upon two burglary convictions in deciding if he 
qualified for an enhanced sentence under S 924(e). He 
insisted that under the law of the state wher e he was 
convicted (Missouri), his convictions "did not involve 
`conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.' " Id. at 579. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the enhancement based upon its 
conclusion that "the word burglary inS 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) 
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means burglary however a state chooses to define it." Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a 
sentencing court applying S 924(e) "must look only to the 
statutory definitions of the prior offenses, or whether the 
court may consider other evidence concerning the 
defendant's prior crimes." 495 U.S. at 600. After carefully 
examining the legislative history, and noting that the text of 
the statute grounded the enhancement on prior 
"convictions" for specified crimes, the Court held that the 
enhancement focused the sentencing court's inquiry"on the 
elements of the statute of conviction, not [on] the facts of 
each defendant's conduct." Id. With one narrow exception 
not relevant to our analysis the Court concluded: 
 
       the only plausible interpretation of S 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is 
       that, like the rest of the enhancement statute, it 
       generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact 
       of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior 
       offense. 
 
Id., at 602. "The Court also noted that the "practical 
difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach 
are daunting [because] [i]n all cases where the Government 
alleges that the defendant's actual conduct fit the generic 
definition of burglary, the trial court would have to 
determine what that conduct was." Id ., at 601. 
 
Although a factual approach would be possible in some 
cases where the charging instrument disclosed the actual 
theories of the case as presented to the jury, it would often 
not be possible to discern the nature of a defendant's prior 
conduct. Application of the enhancement in such instances 
would therefore result in inequitable treatment from state 
to state or even within a given jurisdiction based only upon 
the specificity of the charging instrument or the availability 
of the jury instructions, or trial transcript. Such difficulties 
are avoided where a sentencing court applying the S 924(e) 
enhancement looks only to the elements of the prior offense 
of conviction as defined by state law. 
 
This categorical approach has not been limited to the 
enhancement under S 924(e). In Roussos v. Menifee, 122 
F.3d 159, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1997) we r elied, in part, on the 
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Taylor rationale and held that the Bur eau of Prisons had 
erred when considering enhancement factors and not 
focusing on the elements of the offense of conviction in 
construing "convicted of a nonviolent offense" for purposes 
of awarding a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3621(e)(2)(B). 
 
The language of the relevant statute her e is even clearer 
than the text of the statutes involved in T aylor and 
Roussos. As noted above, S 2251(d) applies when an 
individual has "one prior conviction . . . under the laws of 
any State relating to the sexual exploitation of children." As 
in Taylor, the language expressly refers to a "conviction," 
not to "conduct" relating to the sexual exploitation of 
children. In order to uphold the enhancement here, we 
would have to read S 2251(d) as applying when the 
defendant has "previously been convicted under the laws of 
any state based upon conduct relating to the sexual 
exploitation of children." The language ofS 2251(d) does not 
fairly support that interpretation. 
 
In his thoughtful dissent, Judge Garth reminds us that 
in United States v. Watkins, 54 F .3d 163 (3rd Cir. 1995), we 
noted that the enhancement contained in S 924(e) does 
allow a sentencing court to apply that enhancement based 
upon a defendant's actual conduct in certain instances. See 
Dissent at 28. In Watkins we stated: 
 
       when the "statutory definition of the prior of fense" is 
       broad enough to permit conviction based on conduct 
       that falls outside of the scope of S 924(e)(2)(B) [here, 
       outside the scope of 18 U.S.C. S 2251(d)], it becomes 
       necessary to look beyond the statute of conviction. 
       Only in such cases may the sentencing court look to 
       the facts of the particular case in order to determine 
       whether the trier of fact necessarily found elements 
       that would qualify the offense as a "violent felony" 
       under S 924(e)(2)(B). 
 
54 F.3d at 166. However, that pr onouncement referred to 
the Supreme Court's discussion of situations where a state 
statute is so broad that it encompasses of fenses that serve 
as predicates for enhancement under S 924(e), as well as 
offenses that do not. In Taylor, the Court held that the 
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burglary enhancement contained in S 924(e) applied 
whenever a defendant had a prior conviction for a crime 
that had the same elements as "generic" bur glary, no 
matter how the crime was labeled under state law. Taylor, 
495 U.S. at 599-600. Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
 
       a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of 
       a S 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, 
       regardless of its exact definition or label, having the 
       basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, 
       or remaining in, a building or structur e, with intent to 
       commit a crime. 
 
Id. at 599. When a given state statute defined burglary 
more narrowly than generic burglary (such as not requiring 
the intent to commit a felony or a violent crime following 
entry) there was clearly no problem as the prior conviction 
must, by definition, include the elements of generic 
burglary. However, some states define burglary to include 
unprivileged entry of a vehicle. In such cases the prior 
conviction would not necessarily satisfy the elements of 
generic burglary. However, in such a case, if the defendant 
had actually been convicted of entering a building, he/she 
would have committed a generic burglary even though the 
statute's definition included conduct that could not serve 
as an enhancement under S 924(e). The Court stated: 
 
       A few States' burglary statutes, . . . define burglary 
       more broadly, e.g., by eliminating the r equirement that 
       the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as 
       automobiles and vending machines, other than 
       buildings. . . . Also, there may be offenses under some 
       States' laws that, while not called "burglary," 
       correspond in substantial part to generic bur glary. . . . 
       This question requires us to address a more general 
       issue--whether the sentencing court in applying 
       S 924(e) must look only to the statutory definitions of 
       the prior offenses, or whether the court may consider 
       other evidence concerning the defendant's prior crimes. 
       The Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that 
       S 924(e) mandates a formal categorical approach, 
       looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior 
       offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying 
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       those convictions. We find the reasoning of these cases 
       persuasive. 
 
Id. at 600 (citations omitted). 
 
It was in this context that we made our pronouncement 
in Watkins. 
 
Watkins argued that the prosecution's reliance upon 
documentary evidence to establish that his prior state 
convictions qualified as enhancements under S 924(e) failed 
to meet the government's burden of pr oof at sentencing. We 
rejected that argument because the uncontested facts in 
the presentence report established that W atkins' prior 
convictions were predicate offenses under S 924(e). We 
stated: 
 
       Here, the information provided in the presentence 
       report enabled the district court to ascertain with 
       certainty the statutes of conviction and the statutes of 
       conviction encompass only conduct that falls within 
       the scope of S 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). . . . Watkins is 
       forced to argue for a per se rule that certified copies of 
       the judgments of conviction are requir ed in every case 
       before a sentencing court may determine that the 
       defendant's prior convictions are for "violent felonies" 
       within the meaning of S 924(e)(2)(B). W e find no 
       persuasive justification for such an inflexible rule and 
       decline to adopt it. 
 
Watkins, 54 F.3d at 167-8 (emphasis added). 
 
However, our discussion in Watkins  can not be divorced 
from the focus of the Supreme Court's inquiry in Taylor. 
There, the Court had to discern what Congress intended 
when it amended the applicable statute in 1986. When 
S 924(e) was originally enacted in 1984 it included burglary 
as a predicate offense for enhancing a sentence of one 
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) (a felon in 
possession of a firearm). However , "[b]urglary was defined 
in the statute itself as `any felony consisting of entering or 
remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property 
of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting a 
Federal or State offense.' " T aylor, 495 U.S. at 581. The 
current version of S 924(e) was enacted into law when 
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Congress passed the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 
1986. Id. at 577. Those amendments made thr ee changes 
in the original 1984 enactment. "This amendment .. . 
expanded the predicate offenses triggering the sentence 
enhancement from "robbery or bur glary" to "a violent felony 
or a serious drug offense"; it defined the term "violent 
felony" to include "burglary"; and it deleted the pre-existing 
definition of burglary." Id. 582. Thus, in Taylor, the Court 
had to examine the legislative history of the amendments to 
determine if Congress intended a substantive change in 
what constituted a predicate offense under S 924(e). The 
Court concluded that the omission did not mean that 
Congress intended to change the definition of burglary. 
 
       The legislative history as a whole suggests that the 
       deletion of the 1984 definition of burglary may have 
       been an inadvertent casualty of a complex drafting 
       process. In any event, there is nothing in the history to 
       show that Congress intended in 1986 to r eplace the 
       1984 "generic" definition of burglary with something 
       entirely different. Although the omission of a pre- 
       existing definition of a term often indicates Congress' 
       intent to reject that definition, we draw no such 
       inference here. 
 
Id. at 589-90 (citations omitted). 
 
Having established that a burglary, as originally defined, 
remained a predicate offense, the Court held that 
sentencing courts must adopt the "categorical approach" in 
determining if a state conviction for bur glary constituted a 
"burglary" for purposes of S 924(e). As noted above, when a 
given state statute includes conduct as burglary that would 
not constitute "generic burglary," the sentencing court can 
only accomplish the required inquiry if itfirst determines if 
the prior conviction was tantamount to "generic burglary" 
as originally defined in S 924(e). Thus, in Watkins, we 
acknowledged that the sentencing court must "look beyond 
the statute of conviction" when a defendant has a prior 
conviction under a statute that labels conduct as a 
burglary that would traditionally not be defined as burglary 
(such as illegally entering of a vehicle with the intent to 
commit a crime). In that situation, the prior "burglary" 
conviction can only serve as a predicate of fense under 
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S 924(e) if the defendant's conduct constituted a "generic 
burglary." Otherwise, there was no conviction for "burglary" 
under S 924(e). Accordingly, our decision in Watkins does 
not allow a sentencing court to impose an enhancement 
under S 2251(d) based on conduct that did not result in a 
conviction for a crime relating to sexual exploitation of 
children, and the dissent's reliance upon our language in 
Watkins is misplaced. 
 
We are similarly unpersuaded by the dissent's reliance 
upon United States v. Sweeten, 933 F .2d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 
1991), and United States v. Barney. 955 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 
1992). See dissent at 27. In Sweeten, the district court 
refused to count a prior conviction for "bur glary of a 
habitation" in Texas as a predicate of fense under S 924(e) 
because Texas defined "habitation" to include vehicles. The 
sentencing court concluded that it was therefor e not a 
conviction for " `burglary' in a generic sense" under Taylor. 
Sweeten, 933 F.2d 767. The government appealed, and the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit r eversed because the 
statute in question defined "habitation" to include 
"vehicles." Accordingly, the statute was limited to such 
vehicles as "trailers, campers, and mobile homes-- whose 
primary purpose is to serve as a dwelling and not as a 
mode of transportation." Id. at 770. Ther efore, the 
defendant's conviction for burglary of a habitation was 
consistent with "generic burglary," and the conviction 
constituted a predicate offense underS 924(e). In reaching 
this conclusion the court relied only upon the elements of 
the offense and did not allow an inquiry into the conduct 
that violated the Texas statute. Thus, contrary to the 
inference raised in Judge Garth's dissent, the court stated: 
"we agree that it would have been err or for the district 
court to inquire into the facts underlying Sweeten's Texas 
conviction." Id at 769. 
 
Similarly, in Barney, the defendant had been convicted 
under a Wyoming statute that defined bur glary to include 
unauthorized entry into "a building, occupied structure or 
vehicle," with the intent of committing a crime. 955 F.2d at 
638.5 The court of appeals upheld the sentencing court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The case actually involved two defendants. W e limit our discussion to 
the court's analysis of Trombley's prior conviction. The court did not 
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enhancement of the defendant's sentence because the 
transcript of the guilty plea colloquy from the prior 
burglaries established that he had illegally entered a 
building, not a vehicle. Therefore, his prior burglary 
convictions satisfied the elements of "generic burglary" 
under S 924(e). Again, however, the court stated the limits 
of the inquiry. The court stated: 
 
       In determining whether a person has been convicted of 
       a crime which may be counted toward enhancement 
       under Taylor, a court must employ a"categorical 
       approach," rather than inquire into underlying facts. 
       This requires a comparison of the elements of the 
       relevant state statute with the basic elements of 
       burglary identified in the Taylor  decision. 
 
955 F.2d at 638 (citations omitted). The court's holding was 
based upon the fact that "Taylor allows `the sentencing 
court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow 
range of cases where a jury was actually r equired to find all 
the elements of generic burglary.' " Id. at 639 (quoting 
Taylor, 110 S.Ct. at 2160). 
 
Our situation is quite different. As noted above, the 
statute that governs Galo's enhancement r equires a "prior 
conviction of . . . laws . . . relating to the sexual exploitation 
of children." Therefore the enhancement is governed by 
whether the law the defendant previously violated relates to 
"sexual exploitation of children." Section 2251(d) does not 
require a sentencing court to deter mine if the prior 
conviction satisfies the generic elements of a crime as does 
S 924(e). Rather, the sentencing court need only determine 
if the statute (not the conduct) the defendant was 
previously convicted of relates to the sexual exploitation of 
children. "Moreover, our conclusion is consistent with the 
practical considerations that guided the Court's analysis in 
Taylor. As the Court noted ther e, "the practical difficulties 
and potential unfairness of a factual appr oach are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
allow one of Barney's prior convictions to serve as a predicate offense 
because there was no indication from the guilty plea colloquy or 
indictment from the prior convition that Bar ney had the intent to 
commit a crime when he entered the "bur glarized" structures. The 
structures were open to the public. 955 F .2d at 640. 
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daunting." 495 U.S. at 601. We have pr eviously cautioned 
that "[a] case-by-case, fact specific appr oach [to applying an 
enhancement statute] . . . could force sentencing courts to 
hold mini-trials, hear evidence and witnesses and otherwise 
engage in a detailed examination of the specific facts 
involved in the prior offense," all of which "would be 
avoided with a categorical approach [that focuses on the 
elements of the prior offense]." United States v. Preston, 910 
F.2d 81, 85 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
Section S 2251(d) incorporates the categorical approach 
because it focuses the sentencing court's attention on the 
statutory definition of a prior conviction. It is the elements 
of a given statute, not the conduct that violates it that 
determines if the statute relates to sexual exploitation of 
children. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred when 
it considered Galo's prior conduct in determining whether 
he was subject to the S 2251(d) enhancement. The court 
should have focused only on the statutory definitions of 
those prior convictions. 
 
Accordingly, we must examine the statutory definitions of 
the crimes Galo was previously convicted of and determine 
whether they are state "laws . . . r elating to the sexual 
exploitation of children." 
 
As recited earlier, Galo's state convictions were for two 
counts each of : (1) Corruption of Minors in violation of 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6301; (2)Endangering the Welfare of 
a Child in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 4304; and 
(3) Indecent Assault in violation of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
S 3126(a)(1) and (a)(2). 
 
Corruption of Minors is defined as follows: 
 
       Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by 
       any act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any 
       minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, 
       entices or encourages any such minor in the 
       commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or 
       encourages such minor in violating his or her par ole or 
       any order of court, commits a misdemeanor of the first 
       degree. 
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18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6301 (emphasis added). It is 
readily apparent that although the statute can include 
conduct relating to the sexual exploitation of children, it 
pertains with equal force to conduct such as gambling, 
underage drinking or drug use. The statute is aimed at 
conduct of any nature that tends to corrupt children. It is 
broad enough to include allowing a minor to view an "R" 
rated video. 
 
       In deciding what conduct can be said to corrupt the 
       morals of a minor, the common sense of the 
       community, as well as the sense of decency, pr opriety 
       and the morality which most people entertain is 
       sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case, 
       and to individuate what particular conduct is r endered 
       criminal by it. 
 
Commonwealth v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. Super. 
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Commonwealth v. Tau Kappa Epsilon, 530 Pa. 416 (1992) 
(fraternities prosecuted for corrupting the morals of minors 
based upon underage drinking). 
 
Endangering the Welfare of a Child is defined as follows: 
 
       A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the 
       welfare of a child under 18 years of age commits an 
       offense if he knowingly endangers the welfar e of the 
       child by violating a duty of care, protection or support. 
 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 4304. The statute clearly relates to 
a breach of the duty of care rather than sexual abuse or 
exploitation. It includes such conduct as par ents refusing 
to obtain medically necessary treatment for a child based 
upon religious beliefs. See Commonwealth v. Barnhat, 497 
A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. 1985) ) (par ent prosecuted for 
refusing to obtain medical treatment for child defended 
charges of endangering welfare of child, and involuntary 
manslaughter by explaining "if I would go to a doctor I 
would be turning my back on my faith."). It also 
criminalizes such negligent parental conduct as leaving a 
plastic bag too close to a sleeping infant who subsequently 
suffocates. Commonwealth v. Fewell, 654 A.2d 1109 (Pa. 
Super., 1995), and intentional physical assaultive behavior 
of a nonsexual nature. Commonwealth v. V ining, 744 A.2d 
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310 (Pa. Super. 2000) (adult caregiver prosecuted for burns 
and beatings inflicted on toddler left in her car e). 
 
Indecent assault is a much closer call, because it 
obviously relates to the sexual nature of an offender's 
conduct. However, it criminalizes, and r elates to, 
nonconsensual indecent touching regardless of the victim's 
age. Pennsylvania law establishes that this of fense is 
committed when 
 
       [a] person who has indecent contact6  with the 
       complainant or causes the complainant to have 
       indecent contact with the person is guilty of indecent 
       assault if: (1) the person does so without the 
       complainant's consent; (2) the person does so by 
       forcible compulsion;. . . . 
 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3126(a)(1) and (a)(2). Galo's 
conduct would have constituted a violation of this statute 
regardless of the age of his victims. Although a minor could 
be the victim of this, or either of Galo's other two state 
offenses, none of the statutory definitions of those three 
crimes establish a conviction under "laws r elating to the 
sexual exploitation of children."7  
 
The government argues that applying the categorical 
approach would produce an "absur d result" because "the 
enhanced penalty provisions of 18 U.S.C. S 2251(d) would 
only apply to defendants convicted in states with statutes 
that are specifically titled `sexual exploitation of children,' 
or that use these terms in their statutory definitions." 
Government's Br. at 31. We disagree. The S 2251(d) 
enhancement would apply if a defendant had a prior state 
conviction for involuntary deviate sexual inter course as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. "Indecent contact" is defined in 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3101 as 
              "[a]ny 
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the 
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desir e in either person." 
 
7. The dissent's contention that "[a]ll three of the Pennsylvania statutes 
under which Galo was previously convicted ar e broad enough to include 
`sexual exploitation of children,' depending on the underlying facts, . . 
.", 
see dissent at 28, is really little mor e than an assertion that Galo was 
previously convicted of conduct relating to the sexual exploitation of 
children. This is not what the statute r equires. 
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defined under the law of Pennsylvania. That of fense 
imposes criminal liability for engaging "in deviate sexual 
intercourse8 with a complainant: . . . who is less than 13 
years of age. . . ." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3123(a)(6). The 
definition does not contain the term "sexual exploitation of 
children." Nevertheless, a prior conviction for this category 
of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse would subject a 
defendant to the S 2251(d) enhancement because the 
conviction would be for a crime relating to the sexual 
exploitation of children. Similarly, a prior conviction for 
statutory rape would establish a conviction "under the laws 
of any State relating to the sexual exploitation of children" 
and subject a defendant to the S 2251(d) enhancement.9 
Congress intended to condition enhancement under 
S 2251(d) on precisely this kind of prior conviction rather 
than on generic convictions that relate to sexual 
exploitation of minors only because of the specific conduct 
of the accused. As the Supreme Court noted in Taylor, only 
in this way can the enhancement be applied in a manner 
that is both uniform and practical. 
 
In sum, because Galo has not previously been convicted 
for violating a law relating to the sexual exploitation of 
children, the district court improperly applied the S 2251(d) 
enhancement to Galo's sentence. 
 
IV. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we reject Galo's 
constitutional challenge to SS 2251(a) and 2242(a)(4)(B). 
However, because none of Galo's prior state convictions 
were convictions "under the laws of any State relating to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. "Deviate sexual intercourse," under Pennsylvania statutory law, is 
defined as, inter alia, "[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus between 
human beings." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3101. "Sexual intercourse 
              [i]n 
addition to its ordinary meaning, includes intercourse per os or per 
anus, with some penetration however slight; emission is not required." 
Id. 
 
9. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code, in a subsection of the rape statute, 
imposes criminal liability on any individual who"engages in sexual 
intercourse with a complaint . . . [w]ho is less than 13 years of age." 18 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 3121(a)(6). 
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the sexual exploitation of children," he is not subject to the 
S 2251(d) enhancement. Therefore, we will vacate Galo's 
sentence and remand for resentencing. 10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although we hold that the specific enhancement in S 2251(d) does 
not apply, we do not suggest that the sentencing court ought to ignore 
that conduct in calculating an appropriate sentence under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. His prior conduct is clearly relevant to 
determining his sentence even though it is not be a predicate offense 
under S 2251(d). 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I am obliged to write separately because, even though I 
agree with the majority's disposition of Galo'sfirst three 
issues on appeal,1 I disagr ee strongly with its failure to 
recognize that the District Court's enhancement of Galo's 
sentence should be approved and, therefor e, affirmed. 
 
Galo complains that his sentence was improperly 
enhanced by the District Court because, claims Galo, he 
did not suffer a state (Pennsylvania) conviction for sexually 
exploiting children.2 Unfortunately, the majority of this 
panel has agreed with him by narrowly construing 18 
U.S.C. S 2251(d). My reading of case authority, particularly 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and a 
common-sense reading of S 2251(d) and the relevant 
Pennsylvania statutes to which Galo pled guilty, as well as 
my review of Galo's plea colloquies and his pr esentence 
report, convince me otherwise. Moreover , I fear that the 
crabbed interpretation by the majority of the provisions of 
S 2251(d) would preclude sentence enhancements that are 
not only warranted but that Congress intended. Let me 
develop this point. 
 
I. 
 
Galo had been indicted in 1990 in Westmor eland County, 
Pennsylvania on a ten-count information which charged 
him with corruption of minors,3 endangering the welfare of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Galo had claimed that Congress has not validly exercised its 
Commerce Clause authority in enacting 18 U.S.C.S 2251(a) and 
S 2252(a)(4)(B)--both of which pertain to the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography. As the majority so aptly holds--a 
holding with which I agree--our decision in United States v. Rodia, 194 
F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2008 (2000), puts Galo's 
claims to rest. 
 
2. The District Court enhanced Galo's sentence under 18 U.S.C. 
S 2251(d), sentencing him to 15 years, the minimum sentence with the 
enhancement. If there had been no enhancement, the range of sentence 
to which Galo was subject under the statute was ten to twenty years. 
 
3. 18 Pa. C.S. S 6301. 
 
                                24 
  
children,4 indecent assault, 5 and involuntary deviate sexual 
intercourse.6 These of fenses had been committed against 
his two nephews--both of whom were minors. Galo pled 
guilty to all counts other than the involuntary deviate 
sexual intercourse counts, which were dismissed pursuant 
to a plea agreement after his pleas of guilty to the other 
eight counts. The information about these convictions is 
found in Galo's presentence report, to which Galo never 
objected. Through his pleas of guilty, Galo also admitted to 
the facts giving rise to the eight counts of the information 
in Westmoreland County. 
 
Thereafter, in 1999, Galo was char ged in a two-count 
indictment in federal court with the production of material 
depicting the sexual exploitation of children. The majority, 
in its opinion, has detailed that indictment and has 
described Galo's prior sexual abuse of his niece fr om 
preschool years to fifth grade. As the majority opinion has 
noted, Galo's abuse of his niece included vaginal touching, 
oral sex, and intercourse. His earlier abuse of his nephews 
included oral and anal sex and touching their genitals. 
 
These acts of Galo have never been denied, have never 
been contradicted, and, as I have recited above, Galo never 
objected to their inclusion in the presentence report that 
was prepared in connection with his federal indictment. 
Indeed, the plea colloquies conducted both by the District 
Court judge and by Judge Ackerman in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Westmoreland County not only flesh out 
the actions taken by Galo relating to his explicit sexual 
conduct with his nephews and niece, but also infor m Galo 
in great detail of the criminal consequences to which he 
was subject in terms of sentence for those actions. 
 
I stress this point because, as I understand the majority 
opinion, it holds that, despite Galo's explicit admissions of 
his acts through his pleas of guilty, the statutory 
definitions of the crimes of which Galo was convicted are 
claimed not to be specifically related to the sexual 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 18 Pa. C.S. S 4304. 
 
5. 18 Pa. C.S. S 3126. 
 
6. 18 Pa. C.S. S 3123. 
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exploitation of children and so, says the majority, the 
District Court improperly applied the S 2251(d) 
enhancement to Galo's sentence. Let me explain why I 
believe the majority was 180 degrees of f the mark in this 
conclusion. 
 
II. 
 
First, I believe that the majority has erred in interpreting 
the term "relating to" as narr owly as it did. Second, the 
majority has failed to recognize that the gravamen of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575 (1990), was that no court should be called upon 
to conduct fact finding with respect to the prior state 
indictments, nor should sentencing courts ignor e 
undisputed facts in connection with prior state convictions. 
Third, the majority has also failed to r ecognize that this 
Court and several of our sister Circuits have interpreted 
Taylor to permit sentencing courts to review prior guilty 
pleas and the descriptions of prior convictions in 
presentence reports in order to deter mine the nature of a 
prior conviction for sentencing enhancement purposes. 
Thus, the sentencing court is not confined to the 
mechanistic reading of a statute which, as the majority 
apparently contends, must contain the r elevant "magic 
terms" (in our case, "sexual exploitation of children"). 
Rather, as both Taylor7 and the cases I discuss below 
instruct us, we can look beyond the words of the statute 
giving rise to the enhanced sentence. 
 
III. 
 
Though the Supreme Court intended to for eclose the 
need for mini-trials for sentencing courts to deter mine the 
elements of a prior conviction, because it did not desire "the 
sentencing court to engage in an elaborate factfinding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. While I agree with my colleagues that Taylor does prescribe a 
"categorical approach," which would appear to restrict the sentencing 
court to look only at the fact of prior conviction and the statutory 
definition of the prior offense, Taylor in fact goes further, as I point 
out 
here, and as the cases which have interpr eted Taylor have held. 
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process regarding the defendant's prior offenses," Taylor, 
495 U.S. at 601, it by no means prohibited sentencing 
courts from determining the elements of prior convictions 
by reference to admissions through guilty pleas and to 
unambiguous documents to which the defendant did not 
object, such as indictments and presentence r eports. 
 
Several Circuit courts have interpreted the Supreme 
Court's decision in Taylor. In United States v. Sweeten, in 
which the district court had enhanced the defendant's 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) based on, inter alia, a 
Texas conviction following a guilty plea for burglary of a 
habitation, the Ninth Circuit explained: "T o say, as Taylor 
clearly does, that a sentencing court may not inquir e into 
the underlying facts of a prior conviction is not to say that 
the original judgment and corresponding criminal statute 
are the only materials that a sentencing court may or 
should consider." 933 F.2d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held in Sweeten that it was 
proper to consider the defendant's plea of guilty to the 
Texas conviction and his indictment, because 
"[c]onsideration of these additional documents, when 
proffered by the government at sentencing, does not require 
any searching inquiry into the underlying facts of a 
defendant's conviction." 933 F.2d at 769. Therefore, held 
the Ninth Circuit, "it is error for a district court . . . to 
restrict its consideration to the original judgment of 
conviction and corresponding criminal statute if also 
presented with documentation or judicially noticeable facts 
that clearly establish that the conviction is a pr edicate 
conviction for enhancement purposes." Sweeten , 933 F.2d 
at 769-70. 
 
The Tenth Circuit considered a similar issue in 
connection with a S 924(e) sentencing enhancement in 
United States v. Barney. 955 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1992). The 
Court held that: 
 
       where enhancement is sought on the basis of a 
       conviction obtained through a guilty plea, the 
       sentencing court may look to the underlying indictment 
       or information and the text of the guilty plea to 
       determine whether the defendant was char ged with 
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       and admitted conduct which falls without question 
       within the ambit of Taylor's generic definition. 
 
955 F.2d at 639. 
 
Finally, in United States v. Watkins, this Court considered 
application of the S 924(e) sentencing enhancement in a 
case where the defendant had previously been convicted of 
five violent felonies and had argued that his sentence 
should not have been enhanced without requiring the 
Government to produce a certified copy of each prior 
judgment of conviction. 54 F.3d 163 (3d Cir . 1995). After 
analyzing Taylor, Judge Stapleton of our Court held that 
these certified copies of judgments of conviction were not 
required to establish that Watkins' prior convictions were 
for violent felonies, stating that (just as in Galo's case): 
 
       when the "statutory definition of the prior of fense" is 
       broad enough to permit conviction based on conduct 
       that falls outside of the scope of S 924(e)(2)(B) [here, 
       outside the scope of 18 U.S.C. S 2251(d)], it becomes 
       necessary to look beyond the statute of conviction. 
       Only in such cases may the sentencing court look to 
       the facts of the particular case in order to determine 
       whether the trier of fact necessarily found elements 
       that would qualify the offense as a "violent felony" 
       under S 924(e)(2)(B). 
 
54 F.3d at 166. Of even greater significance, we noted that 
"[i]t is well established in this cir cuit, and all others, that a 
sentencing court may rely on the facts set forth in the 
presentence report when their accuracy is not challenged 
by the defendant." Watkins, 54 F .3d at 166-67. 
 
IV. 
 
Applying Taylor and its progeny to this case, I would hold 
that the sentencing court properly looked at the state court 
plea colloquy to determine whether the prior convictions 
were "relating to the sexual exploitation of children." All 
three of the Pennsylvania statutes under which Galo was 
previously convicted are broad enough to include "sexual 
exploitation of children," depending on the underlying facts, 
as set forth in the state court information, Galo's two guilty 
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pleas, and the federal presentence report. Indeed, the 
majority readily concedes that violations of these statutes 
could include sexual exploitation of children, (See Maj. Op. 
at 19-20), but inexplicably does not extend this r easoning 
to examine and report upon the underlying char ging 
documents, as instructed in Taylor and in our precedent in 
Watkins. 
 
18 Pa. C.S. S 6301, "Corruption of minors," provides: 
"Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any 
act corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor 
less than 18 years of age . . . commits a misdemeanor of 
the first degree." 18 Pa. C.S. S 6301(a)(1). As the majority 
points out, the phrase "by any act" clearly"can include 
conduct relating to the sexual exploitation of children," in 
addition to other conduct. (Maj. Op. at 19-20.) 
 
18 Pa. C.S. S 4304, "Endangering welfar e of children," 
provides that "[a] parent, guar dian, or other person 
supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age 
commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare 
of the child by violating a duty of care, pr otection or 
support." 18 Pa. C.S. S 4304(a). Such a duty of care is 
certainly violated by sexually exploiting the child. 
 
Finally, 18 Pa. C.S. S 3126, "Indecent assault," provides 
that "[a] person who has indecent contact with the 
complainant or causes the complainant to have indecent 
contact with the person is guilty of indecent assault if[ ] the 
person does so without the complainant's consent[or] the 
person does so by forcible compulsion." 18 Pa. C.S. 
S 3126(a)(1) and (2). By its language ("indecent contact"), 
this statute manifestly concerns sexual exploitation, as the 
majority admits, stating that "it obviously r elates to the 
sexual nature of an offender's conduct," (Maj. Op. at 21), 
and the sexual conduct obviously may involve a minor , as 
the statute has no age restriction.8  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The majority has characterized the Pennsylvania statute proscribing 
indecent assault as "a much closer call." It r ecognizes that the statute 
criminalizes conduct such as Galo's nonconsensual indecent touching of 
his nephews and admits that Galo's conduct would have constituted a 
violation of this statute regardless of the age of his victims. Then, 
unaccountably, it states, "[a]lthough a minor could be the victim of this, 
or either of Galo's other two offenses, none of the statutory definitions 
of 
those three crimes establish a conviction under`laws relating to the 
sexual exploitation of children.' " (Maj. Op. at 21.) 
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Because all of the Pennsylvania statutes under which 
Galo was convicted include "sexual exploitation of children" 
and are overbroad, the District Court pr operly went 
"beyond the mere fact of conviction," Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
602, in deciding to apply the S 2251(d) sentencing 
enhancement. As I have demonstrated, the Ninth and T enth 
Circuits have permitted district courts to look at the 
underlying guilty pleas under Taylor, and this Court has 
held in Watkins that the presentence report may be 
considered in a sentence-enhancing context as well. I have 
reviewed Galo's state court plea colloquy, his plea colloquy 
in District Court, and the presentence r eport in this case, 
none of which, if consulted by the majority, have been 
discussed in its opinion, and I cannot understand how the 
Government's position that Galo had a prior conviction 
relating to the sexual exploitation of childr en can be 
rejected. 
 
V. 
 
Let me revisit the relevant proceedings in the Court of 
Common Pleas and in the District Court for a moment. In 
the plea colloquy in state court, the state court judge 
explained: "Now I'm going to explain the counts to which 
you will be pleading guilty. And you will notice that this is 
what the Commonwealth would be required to prove if you 
pled not guilty. This is what you are admitting by pleading 
to these charges." He then outlined four elements that the 
Commonwealth would have to prove before Galo could be 
convicted of the two counts of corruption of minors, 18 Pa. 
C.S. S 6301: 1) "that Jerry Galo was a child under eighteen 
years of age"; 2) "that at the time you wer e over eighteen 
years of age"; 3) "that you engaged in indecent contact with 
Jerry Galo"; and 4) "that that contact corrupted or tended 
to corrupt his morals." As to the second count of corruption 
of minors, the government "would have to pr ove those same 
elements in regard to Scott Galo." As the state court judge 
explained corruption of minors to Galo, "indecent contact"9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. I do not believe that the majority would dispute that "indecent 
contact" qualifies as "sexual exploitation." The majority points out that 
this term is defined as "[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate 
parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual 
desire in either person." (Maj. Op. at 21 n.6 (quoting 18 Pa. C.S. 
S 3101).) 
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was an essential element of the offense and an element to 
which Galo pled guilty. Galo, through his plea of guilty, 
admitted these facts and elements. 
 
The state court judge set forth three elements for the two 
counts of endangering the welfare of childr en, 18 Pa. C.S. 
S 4304: 1) "that Jerry Galo was under eighteen years of 
age"; 2) "that you owed a duty of care, protection or support 
to him"; and 3) "that you violated that duty and endangered 
his welfare by having indecent contact with him." The state 
court judge stated that "[t]he same elements would have to 
be proven in count ten but in regar d to Scott Galo." Once 
again, Galo pled guilty to two counts of endangering the 
welfare of a child, for which "indecent contact" was an 
element of the offense. Galo, through his plea of guilty, 
admitted these facts and elements. 
 
Finally, the state court judge explained that indecent 
assault, 18 Pa. C.S. S 3126, has two elements: 1) "that you 
had indecent assault or contact with another person and 
that person was not your spouse"; and 2) "that the contact 
was made without that person's consent." The state court 
judge explained that "[t]he person referred to in count four 
is Jerry Galo" and "[t]he parallel char ge is at count nine 
with regard to Scott Galo," both of whose status as children 
would have to be proven with respect to the counts of 
corruption of minors and endangering the welfar e of 
children. Galo, through his plea of guilty, admitted these 
facts and elements. 
 
By the terms of the plea colloquy, Galo pled guilty to 
these eight counts in state court involving "indecent 
contact," i.e., "sexual exploitation," with children. 
Additionally, the presentence report described Galo's state 
court conviction under prior convictions. The pr esentence 
report stated that Galo was charged in state court after his 
niece informed the New Kensington police that Galo had 
been sexually abusing her brothers (his nephews), and the 
police interviewed the two nephews. According to the 
presentence report and as I noted earlier , the abuse of the 
elder nephew "consisted of oral and/or anal sex and 
touching of each other's penis," and the abuse of the 
younger nephew "consisted of touching each other's penis 
and later of oral sex." 
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These charges have never been contradicted, and Galo's 
admissions have never been denied. This case does not 
require judicial fact finding or mini-trials, nor does it 
require a review of subjective, disputable evidence of Galo's 
actions to justify the enhanced sentence. These 
uncontradicted charges and Galo's admissions are integral 
to Galo's state court convictions and leave no uncertainty 
as to the content of Galo's prior convictions. They each 
relate to sexual exploitation of childr en. Thus we do not 
encounter the problem foreseen by the Supr eme Court in 
Taylor when it expressed concer n about adding another 
level of fact finding to the sentencing pr oceedings. 
 
VI. 
 
Because of the broad nature of the Pennsylvania statutes 
under which Galo was convicted, the District Court 
properly conducted further inquiry under T aylor and 
determined that, in Galo's case, the of fenses to which he 
pled guilty in state court related to "sexual exploitation of 
children." The District Court's decision to apply the 
sentencing enhancement to Galo's sentence was well in line 
with Supreme Court precedent and pr ecedent from this and 
other Circuits. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the 
majority's failure to affirm the District Court's enhanced 
sentence of Galo. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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